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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes a sample of 15 fuel-handling events from the past ten years at
commercial nuclear reactors with significant human error contributions in order to detail
the contribution of human error to fuel-handling activities, emphasizing how latent
conditions can directly contribute to events. In particular, procedural inaccuracies often
create conditions that lead to the development of errors related to maintenance work
practices. This would be of significant concern for a pre-closure safety assessment for a
geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, where many
fuel-handling work activities would be performed. Specific emphasis is placed on fuel
movement activities and control of ventilation systems, which could significantly impact
worker and public health and safety in the case of a fuel-handling accident.
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1. Introduction and Background
Administrative controls can have a significant effect on human reliability. In a study of
commercial nuclear power plants performed by Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), 37 operating events in which human error was a
factor were analyzed qualitatively and categorized as shown in Table 1 [1]. .
Table 1: INEEL Human Error Report (Gertman, et al.) Summary by Category
Error Category Descriptions Percentage of Operating Events .
Operations 54%
Design and Design Change Work Practices 81%
Maintenance Practices and Maintenance Work
Controls 76%
Procedures and Procedure Development . 38% 9
Corrective Action Program 41%
Management and Supervision 30%
Operations errors included resource allocation, operator knowledge or training, operator
actions, and communications, while design and work design change.work practice errors,
included design deficiencies, design change testing, and inadequate engineering I
evaluation, with maintenance practice and maintenance work control errors considering ,-
issues in work package development, inadequate maintenance practices, inadequate
technical knowledge, and inadequate post-maintenance testing, while corrective action
program errors included failure to respond to industry notices, failure to follow industry
practices, and failure to correct known deficiencies, and errors resulting from
management and supervision included issues such as inadequate supervision,
organizational structure, and inadequate knowledge of plant operations. Procedures and
procedure development included no specific sub-classifications. 81% of the total errors
were latent errors, which are errors that are committed prior to the event initiator and are
not recognized until the event occurs [1]. Latent errors were noted as causing the greatest
increase in plant risk [1]. Many of these errors could have been mitigated by the
placement of and adherence to correctly documented procedures and appropriately
.implemented administrative controls, since latent errors can accumulate over time and, if
correctly identified, can be resolved before an event occurs.
Human errors in nuclear materials-handling (cask, canister, and fuel assembly handling)
are likely to affect.safety operations of the potential geologic repository for spent nuclear
fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), such as the proposed geologic '
repository at Yucca Mountain which is designed to potentially accommodate up to
119,000 metric tons of heavy metal. Such a repository would involve pre-closure
operations including receiving spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in
shipping casks, uiloading and packaging of SNF and HLW into suitable waste packages
for long-term underground storage, transporting waste packages from the surface to the
undergrotiind facility and emplacing waste packages in underground drifts [19]. It is
'necessary for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to perform an assessment of safety
before permanent closure for such a repository in order to demonstrate compliance with -
performance objectives to limit doses to workers and the public within acceptable risk
'levels. -The preclosure safety analysis must consider potential hazards to demonstrate that
repository can be operated within specified exposure limits and safety standards in the
preclosure period [ 18]. This is performed through an identification of hazards and
initiating events, including any site specific hazards, as well as determination of their'
associated probabilities of occurrence and consequences. This leads to identification of
event sequences and determination of the effectiveness of safety features and availability
of safety systems, developing risk significance categorizations of structures, systems and
components related to safety, allowing a consequence analysis that can demonstrates the
repository's ability to satisfy regulatory acceptance criteria [18]. Examination of how
both active and latent human errors occur and how they can be prevented will provide
insight into preclosure safety analysis at such a repository.
Through examination of past nuclear materials-handling issues, this report gives insight
into: (1) what materials-handling issues have occurred in the past and why, (2) what are
the potential consequences, and (3) the implications for a repository. By examining
licensee event reports (LERs), which are required from the licensee whenever off-normal
events occur, this report qualitatively analyzes past materials-handling events at
commercial nuclear power plants in which human.error contributed to overall risk, and
identifies administrative controls (e.g., procedures) that could reduce the risk due to
human errors.
2. Methodology
Licensee event reports cite control issues that can be analyzed qualitatively according to
event types and safety significance. An LER is required each time an event meets
reporting requirements according to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
regulations. By classifying events into error categories following Gertman, et al.
methodology, an investigation of the most effective administrative controls to reduce risk
due to human errors in materials-handling events can be performed. Categories were
chosen to divide errors into areas pertaining to different employee groups, including
operators, maintenance staff, and management, before classifying the error into sub-
classifications that more specifically define the error type. This combination of
categories and sub-classifications allows for a general overview of the type of work
activity in which the errors occurred. The Human Factors Information System (HFIS)
database, created by the NRC as a source of information on human performance issues,
was used to select events for analysis. The HFIS database attempts to describe overall
performance at individual plants, and is not all-inclusive. For this reason, the HFIS
database can be utilized to describe overall human performance concerning fuel-handling
activities, reporting typical fuel-handling incidents.
The HFIS database identified sixteen events concerning fuel-handling issues since
January 1, 1996 at commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. in which human
performance errors contributed. Fifteen of these events were broken down into error sub-
classifications and analyzed qualitatively from information provided by the
corresponding LER. One event LER was unable to be procured. The time span of
January 1, 1996 to present was decided to give a time span recent enough that events are
all relevant considering.evolution of nuclear industry regulations and typical management.
procedures over time.
Individual errors that contribute to events are broken down into.four over-arching
classifications and nine total sub-classifications. These classifications were used to
categorize and assess the common varieties of events in fuel-handling resultant from
human errors. The initial categories are operations errors, maintenance practices,
procedures, and management errors. Operations errors include those that directly
involved operations personnel. In the context of events studied, these were broken down
into two sub-classifications, (1) inadequate knowledge or tfaining, where the operators
erred due to a deficiency in knowledge of a specific system or activity that contributed to
the event, and (2) communications errors, in which an error occurred as a result of
ineffective or misleading communications between operations personnel and other
department personnel. Maintenance errors include all .errors stemming from work
occurring on the plant floor, including refueling, inspections, or other work practices that
are not wholly controlled by operations personnel. This was developed into the three
sub-classifications of(1) work package development - dealing with preparations for
work activities, including effectiveness of pre-job briefings - (2) inadequate maintenance
and maintenance practices - occurring when a work activity was performed incorrectly or
ineffectively, or otherwise failed to achieve the work task - and (3) inadequate technical
knowledge - grouping errors due to work personnel lacking knowledge or technical skills
related to the equipment or system or which work is being performed. The procedures
category contains only a single classification, inaccurate procedures and procedure
development, concerning incomplete and unclear procedures or-procedures that are
otherwise in need of revision. Management and supervision errors include those issues
occurred.due to inadequate supervision, management, or organizational concerns.
:Management errors are also divided into three sub-classifications, including (1)-
....... inadequate supervision, for errors that occurred because inadequate supervision led to a
failure to meet established work activity requirements, (2) inadequate knowledge of,
systems and plant operations, for errors that occurred due to inadequate knowledge of
plant systems and operations on the part of plant management to effectively administrate
work practices, and (3) organizational structure, for errors that occurred due to the ..
organizational structure of the plant causing inefficient or improperly developed work
activities. .
Gertman, et al, from which these present classifications were adapted, considered
additional categories and classifications, but these are unnecessary for consideration of
fuel-handling events, which mainly concern the spent fuel pool (SFP), ventilation system,
and refueling operations, and were not affected as frequently by operations or design and
design change work practices [1]. LERs do not cite sufficient information to analyze
errors involving plant corrective action programs. The classifications that are considered
here are sufficient for developing an understanding of likely issues to contribute to a pre-
closure safety analysis for a large-scale long-term repository for spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste.
3. Event Analysis Results
The events selected for review included fuel-handling issues in commercial nuclear
reactors in the U.S. from the past ten years in which human errors were a significant.
contributor. Due to this specific subset of operating experience, no serious significant '
system losses were examined, with most event reports resulting from Technical
Specification (TS) violations. TS are criteria under which plants are required to operate,
regulating most every aspect of plant operations including, among others, reactivity
control systems, refueling operations, containment systems. Technical Specifications -are
developed by-the NRC to effectively govern plant operations and safety [17]. While
failure to meet established TS requirements alone may not be significant risk issues, these
violations. can be significant risk-contributors and indicate breaches in nuclear fuel-
handling safety important for consideration.
Table 3-1: Error Summary by Human Error Categories
# of Latent # of Active;
Category Description [Count / % of Total Errors (40)] Errors Errors .
Operations [5 / 11.9%]
Inadequate Knowledge or Training . 2
Communications 2
Maintenance Practices and Work Control [24 / 57.1%]
Work Package Development, QA and Use 8 2
Inadequate Maintenance or Maintenance Practices 4 7
Inadequate Technical Knowledge 4
Procedures [9 / 21.4%]
Inadequate Procedures and Procedure Development 9
Management and Supervision [4 /9.5%]
Inadequate Supervision 1
Inadequate Knowledge of Systems and Plant
Operations 1
Organizational Structure 2
Subtotals 31 12
I_·
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Tables 3-1 and 3-2 give error summaries by human error categories. Maintenance
Practices and Work Control is clearly the dominant human error classification for these
fuel-handling events, containing 55% of classified errors and occurring in 14 of the 15
events studied. The 15 events analyzed in this thesis are presented and described below.
A summary is given for each event as well as insights from the LER. This is followed by
a listing of human performance issues for each event, classified as either "active" errors -
"human errors that influenced the initiation, mitigation, or progression of the event" [1] -
or "latent" errors - "errors committed prior to the event whose effects are not discovered
until the event occurs" [1] - and are itemized into specific error subcategories. Table 3-3
summarizes the errors by category and by event.;
Table 3-2: Error Category Presence in Events
Error Category Description % of Events
Operations 33.3
Maintenance Practices and Work Control 93.3
Procedures 53.3
Management and Supervision 20.0
3-1: Arkansas Nuclear Unit 2 Event, November 16, 2000 (LER 2000-003-00)
On November 16, 2000, with Unit 2 core reload in progress during a scheduled refueling
outage, refueling machine underload indications were received and the core reload was
suspended. Investigation revealed that the weight of the dummy fuel assembly used to
calibrate the refueling machine was approximately 104 pounds heavier than the value
used for calibration. The refueling machine was recalibrated with the revised dummy
fuel assembly weight and core reload was resumed. The calibration was incorrect due to
an incorrect diiinmy fuel assembly weight approximation, originally assigned the
conservative value of 2387 pounds in 1992, then determined as 1904 pounds in February
1994 but determined in the course of investigation into this event as 2008 pounds. The
most likely reason for the discrepancy is that a load cell with a large span was used [2].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Underdeveloped refueling machine Latent Procedures- and procedure
calibration procedures development
Personnel incorrectly calibrated Active Inadequate maintenance or
refueling machine maintenance practices
3-2: D.C. Cook Unit 1 Event, November:19, 2001 (LER 2001-005-01)
On November 19, 2001, the Rod Control Cluster Assembly (RCCA) tool was mistakenly
moved over the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) fuel racks.. The potential impact energy of the
RCCA tool is greater than the limit of 24,240. in-lbs detailed by technical specifications.
The surveillance requirement to determine potential impact energy as within this limit
before moving each load over the fuel racks also'wa not performed. The spent fuel
crane operator mistakenly moved the load over the'spent fuel pool racks, failing to
reinstate the hoist height interlock before zoviring the crane. The SFP area supervisor
noticed this action immediately and alerted the-crane operator to stop and lower the load
to below the hoist interlock and reinstate the interlock [3].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Crane operator moved load over Active Inadequate maintenance or
SFP racks without reinstating hoist maintenance practices
height interlock
Failure to perform peer check prior Latent Inadequate maintenance or
to RCCA tool movement maintenance practices
Failure to calculate potential impact Latent Inadequate maintenance or
energy maintenance practices
3-3: D.C. Cook Unit 2 Event, July 20, 2000 (LER 2000-011-00)
On June 28, 1999, the SFP exhaust ventilation system was determined to be in a degraded
condition, requiring the placement of the SFP exhaust ventilation system in the charcoal
filter mode of operation prior to movement of fuel within or over the SFP as a
compensatory condition to maintain the system in an operable status. On July 19, 2000,
the system was placed in charcoal filter mode as fuel top nozzle inspections began. A
pre-job brief was conducted including those involved in fuel inspections, and the
refueling supervisor contacted the control room to ensure operation of SFP exhaust
ventilation system prior to starting inspections. -The SFP exhaust ventilation system was
removed from the charcoal filter mode of operation when fuel inspections were stopped
for the day. On July 20, 2000, the SFP exhaust ventilation system was place in charcoal
filter mode while fuel inspections continued. Auxiliary building crane and main hoist
inspections were also begun, with no pre-job brief conducted. .The crane clearance which
maintains the main load block was de-energized and removed for crane inspections. The
refueling supervisor contacted the work control center to ensure that the crane clearance
would be restored prior to removing the SFP ventilation system from the charcoal filter
mode of operation. Work control personnel misinterpreted this and notified control room
personnel that fuel inspections were complete, resulting in the crane clearance being
rehung and the SFP exhaust ventilation system being removed from the charcoal filter
mode of operation. The ventilation system was removed from the charcoal filter mode of
operation for approximately 1-1/2 hours with fuel movement still in progress. Removing
the charcoal filters from operation resulted in the system being inoperable since the
compensatory actions were no longer in place. Upon discovery of this condition, control
room personnel suspended all operations involving movement of fuel and cranes within
the SFP area [4].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Inadequate/miscommunication Active Communications
between control room and
inspections p'ersonnel
No pre-job brief conducted for Latent Work package development,
auxiliary building crane inspections QA'and use
Control room personnel not Latent Work package development,
involved in pre-job brief for the fuel . QA and use
top nozzle inspections
3-4: D.C. Cook Unit 2 Event, February 12, 2002 (LER 2002-002-00)
SOn January 20, 2002 the control air headers had been cross-tied with air hose jumpers in
preparation for leak rate testing of a containment isolation valve (CIV), to allow the #2
Sheaders to be fed by the #1 headers while the CIV for the #2 headers was isolated for
Stesting. The air hose jumper installation was not logged in the: Proceduralized Temporary
Modification Log in the control room as required by the Temporary Modification
Procedure, but was left in place to support maintenance activities on the CIV. On
January 26, 2002, in further preparation for the leak rate-testing, the CIV was isolated
from the rest of the control air system by closing the upstream shut off valve and the
downstream shutoff valves for the control air containment ring headers, and test
connection valves were also opened on both sides of the CIV, one inside containment and
one outside. This alignment was left in place, via a clearance, to support maintenance
activities the CIV. At the time, refueling integrity was established by an option that
consisted of closing the CIV. On February 9, 2002, refueling integrity was reestablished
by the procedurally preferred method by confirming that the penetration is actively
pressurized by control air. Being pressurized, the penetration does not provide direct
access from the containment to the outside atmosphere, but this method of verification
was determined to be ineffective if the control air headers are cross-tied. Another method
of establishing refueling integrity should have been chosen, one which closes:the CIV or
otherwise closes off the penetration. On February 12, 2002 during core alterations
maintenance activities on the CIV, the valve was stroked open with test connections open
on both sides of the penetration thus creating a path from the atmosphere inside
containment to the atmosphere outside containment, resulting in a breach of refueling
integrity [5].
Human Performance Issues ,
3-5: Dresden Unit 2 Event, August 20, 1998 (LER 1998-012-00)
On August 19, 1998, maintenance repair of a control room heating, ventilation and air
conditioning (HVAC) refrigeration condensing unit (RCU) inlet valve was given a higher
priority in the work schedule due to package leaking concerns. The operations out of
service (OOS) group prepared an OOS for the valve repair in order to aid the work
package preparation. The work scheduler failed to perform a review of the valve repair
impact on overall work schedule, resulting in an upcoming fuel move being scheduled
with the control room ventilation system OOS. On August 20, 1998, hanging of the OOS
was completed and operations entered the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Failure to document control air Latent Inadequate maintenance or:.
header cross-tie jumper installation maintenance practices
Inappropriate:choice in method of Active Work package development,;
reestablishing refueling integrity QA and use
Procedures did not consider the Latent Procedures and procedure
possibility that the control air ring development
headersimay be cross-tied
I
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inoperable control room emergency ventilation. The unit supervisor did not recognize
that the control room HVAC RCU LCO was in conflict with the upcoming scheduled fuel
bundle move, and thus permission was given and the fuel was moved with the RCU
inoperable. On August 21, 1998, a new operating crew denied permission to resume .
movement of the fuel bundle, recognizing the previous non-compliance with technical
specifications [6]..
Human.Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Failure to thoroughly review Latent Work package development,
changes in work schedule QA and use
Failure to consider contingency Latent Work package development; ,
measures in LCO review QA and use
Failure of unit supervisor to Latent Inadequate knowledge of..,
recognize violations of technical systems and plant operations
specifications
Work planning process placing Latent Organizational structure .
over-reliance oni operations
department to manage technical
specification adherence
Failure of senior operator to Active Inadequate knowledge or
recognize LCO's effect on refueling training :
activities ._-
3-6: Farley Unit 1 Event, March 15, 2000 (LER 2000-003-00)
On March 15, 2000, with Unit 1 defueled, a valid high radiation alarm occurred on an
SFP ventilation radiation monitor, resulting in an automatic start of the B-train
penetration room filtration system (PRF). This also resulted in automatic shutdown of
the normal SFP ventilation system, causing an automatic start of the A-train PRF system.
The high alarm was caused by radioactive gases released from a fuel sipping activity
being performed to identify leaking fuel assemblies. Small releases of radioactive gas are
expected when sipping a fuel assembly with leaking pins. Although the release of
radioactive gases into the SFP area was expected and the potential for radiation monitors
alarming was communicated to the control room, the potential for the automatic start of
the PRF was not recognized. The PRF system functioned as.designed. No abnormal
offsite radioactive release was indicated [7].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Procedures for leak detection Latent Procedures or procedure
inadequate development
Failure to consider effect of gas Active Work package development,
release when performing fuel QA and use
sipping activity
3-7: Farley Unit 1 Event, March 23, 2000 (LER 2000-004-00)
On March 23, 2000, it was determined that three spent fuel assemblies had been loaded in
configurations contrary to technical specifications, with this condition first occurring,
during the core offload of the refueling cycle which had begun on March 13, 2000.
Manual verification, as well as the review of the verification process, of the acceptability
of proposed offload configuration failed to identify that the proposed configuration did
not meet the acceptable configurations [8].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Personnel responsible for developing, Active Inadequate maintenance -and
performing, and verifying SFP maintenance practices
configuration (lid not recognize
configuration as unacceptable
Personnel responsible for developing Latent Inadequate technical
SFP configuration lacked sufficient knowledge
knowledge to determine an
acceptable configuration
Lack of detail in core offload Latent Procedures and procedure
procedure development
Insufficient independent review in the Latent Work package development,
verification process QA and use
3-8: Palisades Event, November 11, 1999 (LER 1999-005-00)
On November 6, 1999, with the plant in refueling shutdown, it was discovered that the
charcoal filter for the fuel storage building ventilation system was not in operation during
fuel handling activities. TS 3.8.4 requires the ventilation system and charcoal filter to be
in operation whenever irradiated fuel which has decayed less than 30 days is being
handled in the fuel storage building. A ventilation system checklist and a general
checklist are used to.ensure the ventilation equipment status meets the requirements for
fuel handling activities. The ventilation system checklist specifies the ventilation
alignment for both fuel handling and non-fuel handling activities. Since fuel handling
was not in progress at the beginning of the shift in question, the completed ventilation
system checklist reflected this condition. The general checklist ensures the proper
ventilation lineup by confirming that the ventilation system checklist has been completed
for fuel handling activities. The licensed operator who completed both checklists
prematurely signed off on the general checklist when the ventilation system checklist had
not been completed for fuel handling activities. The operator intended to properly align
the charcoal filter upon notification that fuel handling activities were to commence, but
was not notified when fuel handling activities were authorized by the control room
supervisor [9].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Operator prematurely completed Latent Inadequate maintenance and
checklist before ventilation maintenance practices
requirements for fuel handling
activities were met
Lack of communication by control Active Communications
room supervisor when fuel moves
were authorized
3-9: Pilgrim Unit 1 Event, March 31, 1998 (LER 1998-006-01)
Reactor operators follow control sequences that limit the reactivity addition and core
heat-up rate. Pilgrim has additional technical specification restrictions on control rod
worth with respect to reactor power. On a particular fuel cycle, a rod drop accident was
evaluated generically and not with plant specific information as had been done in the
past. On March 31, 1998, plant personnel noticed that plant specific control rod worth
values necessary to verify compliance with technical specifications were not provided
[10].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Lack of oversight by core design Latent Inadequate technical
engineers in recognizing technical knowledge
specification requirements on
control rod worth
Inadequate review of plant design Latent Procedures and procedure
change led staff to omit control rod development
worth requirements from design
criteria
3-10: Prairie Island Unit 1 Event, May 8, 1999 (LER 1999-05-00)
On May 8, 1999, with Unit 1 in refueling shutdown, during a reactor upper internals
replacement procedure, personnel identified that the reactor upper internals were moved
over the open fueled reactor vessel with the containment in-service purge system
operating. Personnel inadvertently missed closing the containment in-service purge
system CIVs and did not discovered this until after the upper internals had been set in the
reactor vessel [11].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Failure to review the procedure to Latent Procedures and procedure
identify the precautions, special development
considerations and procedure steps to
the satisfaction of regulatory
requirements .
Inadequate review of procedure by Latent Inadequate supervision
work group supervisor
Inadequate pre-job briefing Latent Work package development,
QA and use
3-11: Salem Unit 1 Event, April 18, 2001 (LER 2001-005-00)
On April 18, 2001 the B 125 VDC battery disconnects were open, rendering the isolation
dampers inoperable on an outside emergency air conditioning air intake. Fuel movement.
occurred in the SFP while the Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System
(CREACS) was available, but not operable. CREACS was available through the DC bus
powered by the battery charger, but it was not operable due to the B 125 VDC battery
disconnect being open to support maintenance on the battery. No isolation dampers were
secured closed at the times when fuel moves occurred in the SFP. Technical
specification requires that with isolation dampers on emergency air conditioning air
intake duct inoperable, core alterations must be immediately suspended and movement of
irradiated fuel assemblies halted until an isolation damper is secured closed to close the
affected duct ['12].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Fuel movement occurred with Active Inadequate maintenance and
CREACS inoperable maintenance practices
Lack of knowledge, by all individuals Latent Inadequate. knowledge or:
involved (licensed operators, outage training
control center), of control area
ventilation system
Recent installation of battery Latent Work package development,
disconnect switches and QA and use
accompanying procedure changes
without clarification on control area
ventilation system requirements I_._
3-12: San Onofre Unit 3 Event, January 20, 2001 (LER 2001-002-00)
On January 18,:2001, during refueling, fuel (both new and irradiated) movement began
from the fuel handling building to the reactor vessel inside containment. Both trains of
Post Accident :Cleanup Unit (PACU) were operable at that time. On January 20, 2001;
PACU train B was removed from service. Due to an equipment failure, fuel movements
were stopped, and late restarted with train B still inoperable and without train A being.
placed into service. Technical specifications require two PACU trains to be operable:
during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel handling building [13].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Technical specification requirements Latent Procedure and procedure
not correctly implemented in plant development
procedures
3-13: Summer Event, April 12, 1999 (LER 1999-003-00)
On April 12, 1999, core alteration activities were begun, during which the refueling crew
started the control rod unlatching revolution for the first drive shaft, when the weight
indicated by the load cell was noted to be incorrect. The crew assumed the load indicator
had failed and did not notice that "peak load" had been selected for the load cell switch
position instead of "continuous." The crew installed a new load cell, for which the
technical specification surveillance test required prior to use. had not been performed, and
unlatched the first control rod drive shaft without requesting permission. The crew
requested permission to unlatch the second drive shaft and were denied, and core
alterations were suspended for the required surveillance, the results of which were not
satisfactory due to the "peak load" read out [14].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Lack of familiarity with surveillance Latent Work package development,
requirements and.operational QA and use
procedures
Set read-out switch to incorrect Active Inadequate maintenance and
position maintenance practices
Lack of familiarity with load cell Latent Inadequate technical
features knowledge
3-14: Susquehanna Unit 1 Event, July 26, 2002 (LER 2002-005-00)
On July 26, 2002, a maintenance mechanic observed that argon gas had been used to •.
backfill a fuel storage Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) instead of helium gas. The DSC vent
and siphon port covers and the outer top cover had been installed and welded into place
when this was discovered, during preparations to move the DSC from the reactor building
refueling floor to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). All dry fuel
storage activities on the refueling floor were suspended, and a repair procedure was
developed to breach the outer top cover, remove the argon gas from the DSC, backfill. it
with helium gas and weld repair the outer top cover. In the meantime a "feed and bleed"
of the demineralized water in the DSC annulus was performed to keep the water
temperature below 160 degrees Fahrenheit until restoration activities were complete. The
repair technique was utilized August 9-11, 2002 and occurred without additional incident.
The DSC was transported to the ISFSI an August 16, 2002 [15].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Argon and helium canisters same Latent Organizational
color, stored together (change in
gas supply vendor)
Erroneous supply hose connections Active Inadequate maintenance and
maintenance practices
Mechanic tested a few canisters in the Active Inadequate maintenance and
cart, erroneously assumed all were: maintenance practices
helium
Inspector only verified.pressure, Latent Procedures and procedure
verifying the correct gas is used to development
backfill the DSC was not identified as
a "critical" procedure step.
No peer check process Latent Procedures and procedure
: development
3-15: Watts Bar Unit 1 Event, March 11, 2005 (LER 2005-001-00)
On March 3, 2005, the containment hatch was opened and containment purge system
activated for refueling outage support. On March 9, 2005, fuel movement began in the
SFP for the inspection of fuel assemblies. On March 11, 2005, it was noticed that having
the containment hatch open while the containment purge system was in operation made.: .
both trains of the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) inoperable.
ABGTS is required operable during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the
fuel handling area [16].
Human Performance Issues
Description Error Type Error Subcategory
Inadequate knowledge or
training
Inadequate technical
knowledge
Inadequate systems operation
instruction
Inadequate fuel handling instruction Le-nt
Description Latent
Table 3-3: Categorical Summary of Active and Latent Failures for Specific Events
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2001-002-00
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San Onofre I Latent
2001-002-00
Summer Latent Active Latent
1999-003-00 3
SusquehannaI Active (2) Latent (2) Latent
2002-005-00 5
Watts Bar 1 Latent Latent
2005-001-00 2
Number of
Events 3 2 8 8 4 8 1 1 2
Percentage of
Events 20.0 13.3 53.3 46.7 26.7 53.3 6.7 6.7 13.3
Total Errors 3 2 10 11 4 9 1 1 2 43
4. Event Analysis Discussion
4-1. Dominant Human Error Categories
Maintenance practices were by far the leading contributor in the fuel-handling events
analyzed; with maintenance practice and work control issues occurring in 14 of the 15 .-
events. This is reasonable since fuel-handling issues are likely to actively result from
specific issues directly involving the materials-handling process. Most events are
initiated by an active error, and since most fuel-handling processes do not directly
involve operations staff, the primary initiator of an event is likely to come about through
maintenance practice issues. Issues such as inadequate knowledge, procedures, or
supervision are usually latent precursors to these initiators and will contribute to an event,
but alone will not cause an event. Eight of the 15 events had active errors in the
maintenance practices and work control category, which were generally mistakes specific
to the given situation, having developed from the latent precursors. The Farley 1 event
on March 23, 2000, displays these concerns, since the inappropriate fuel assembly
configuration stemmed latent errors including underdeveloped core offload procedures
and personnel verifying SFP configuration possessing inadequate knowledge and
experience for the task, directly contributing to an active error in maintenance practices
as the spent fuel assemblies were loaded in an inappropriate configuration.
Inadequate procedures were also a large contributor, affecting just over half the events.
A common latent issue was procedures that were underdeveloped and lacking sufficient
detail. Either the procedures did not clearly specify and detail work activities, such as the
refueling machine calibration procedures for the Arkansas Nuclear 2 event on November
16, 2000, or the procedures failed to consider a specific condition requiring alternative
treatment as a possibility, such as the procedures for reestablishing refueling integrity
failing to incorporate the condition of cross-tied control ring air headers. for the D.C.
Cook 2 event on February 12, 2002.
4-2. Significance of Latent Errors
Although most events are initiated by active errors of the part ofpersonnel, in many cases
latent errors were large contributors to the event. Some of:the events could have been .
; prevented by correction of latent errors prior to the event. In other cases the correction of
latent errors would not have such s dramatic effect. Properly developed refueling
machine'calibration procedures, correctly implemented, could have prevented the
Arkansas Nuclear 2 event on November.16, 2000. More thorough pre-job briefings-for
.the D.C. Cook 1 event on July, 20, 2000, would have better. informed personnel on the
specifics of the work activities being performed, although this would likely not have.
prevented the event, since the main instigator of the event; miscommunication with
control room personnel, may not have been prevented. In. the case of the D.C. Cook 2
event on February 12, 2002, proper documentation of the control air header cross-tie
jumper installation would have assisted personnel in realizing that the procedurally
preferred method of reestablishing refueling integrity was inappropriate given that
condition. For the Dresden 2 event on August 20, 1998, a more thorough scheduling
review would have identified that the upcoming fuel move had been scheduled an LCO
with the control room ventilation system operations out of service. Identifying that
conflict would have resulted in a delay of fuel movement that would have completely
prevented the event.
S4,3. Risk Significance of Events
Most of these events were considered to have minimal risk significance, since they had
no effect on public health and safety and only inconvenienced plant operations, but some
of these events could possibly have become larger concerns in combination with other.
occurrences. The redundancy of many systems, as well as multiple safety barriers
preventing an accident from becoming a catastrophe, help reduce the effect of any single
.failure. Since the.events ranged from underdeveloped procedures to inappropriate
operation-of the SFP ventilation system, some events exhibited no direct effect on worker -
health and safety, while mbre significant errors created a larger concern for plant
": operations.
.4-3-1: The. Arkansas Nuclear 2 event on November 16, 2000 has minimal safety •
significance since the refueling machine does not provide any function directly related to.
reactor safety; overload cut-off limits function to prevent excessive lifting forces from
damaging to the reactor vessel during fuel assembly lifting. operations. The. discrepancy
between the calibration values was judged small enough such that it would not be
expected to result. in significant damage to the reactor vessel or core internals in the case
of inadvertent engagement [2].
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4-3-2: The D.C. Cook 1 event on November 19, 2001 is considered to be of minimal
safety significance since the fuel-handling manipulation equipment interlocks are
designed to prevent drops that would damage the fuel. The auxiliary safety chain
securing the RCCA tool to the crane hoist would have prevented the RCCA tool from,...
dropping, so there were multiple barriers present to prevent damage to the fuel [3].
4-3-3: For the D.C. Cook 2 event on July 20, 2000, radiological dose consequence
calculations showed that the potential dose to control room personnel would be well ,.
below the design criteria limits even without the SFP exhaust filtration in operation. This
low dose is due to the low spent fuel source term over the short length of time fuel
movement. occurred without the SFP exhaust ventilation charcoal filter in operation since
both units were shutdown. Doses from a fuel-handling accident in the SFP area would
have resulted in considerably low radiological doses, so dose limits are met even withoutý
charcoal filtration through the SFP ventilation system, such that the event was of minimal
safety-significance and would have remained such even in the event of a fuel-handling .
accident [4].
4-3-4: For the D.C. Cook 2 event on February .12, 2002, the loss of refueling integrity
was limited to the time it took to the CIV open and closed. Operability and closure
restrictions restrict radioactive releases from an element ruptures from lack of
containment pressurization in refueling mode. Requirements on containment building
penetration closure ensure that radioactive releases within containment do not leak to the
environment, so there was minimal impact on public health and safety [5]. However, this
is still of concern since there was a pathway from the atmosphere inside containment to
the atmosphere outside containment, and in the event of a pressure failure, radioactive
releases leaking to the environment could possibly have occurred.
4-3-5: For the Dresden 2 event on August 20, 1998, a primary concern was that the
potential existed to achieve criticality during inspection of the damaged fuel bundle or
cleanup activities. A second concern would be the accidental dropping of damaged fuel
bundles onto the fuel storage racks, resulting in damage to intact fuel assemblies. The
depleted fuel stored within the SFP had sufficient time to decay since removal from the
core, with the only concern for release being the release of radioactive krypton. The
SBGTS and secondary containment remained operable, ensuring that potential releases.
from the refueling floor would be routed through the SBGTS charcoal beds, adsorbing
radioactive krypton released from damaged fuel. Calculation and analysis of these
potential risks concluded that there was minimal safety significance [6].
4-3-6: In the Farley 1 event on March 15, 2000, no abnormal radioactive releases
resulted. Public health and safety were not affected. The SFP radiation monitor alarm
was set well below the TS required limit. The workers were aware of and prepared for
small releases of radioactive gases resulting from fuel sipping activities, and had only
failed to consider the potential of the PRF to start automatically due to those releases [7].
4-3-7: The Farley 1 event on March 23, 2000, was of minimal safety significance. The
boron concentration was sufficient to prevent criticality, even neglecting the Boraflex
neutron adsorber located in the SFP racks [8].
• 4-3-8: The Palisades event on November 11.; 1999, had:minimal safety significance. In
-the event that a fuel-handling incident had occurred, fuel-handling accident operations
procedure directs immediate action to place the charcoal filter in service if it is not
already, which would have mitigated any potential radioactive release [9]. In the event of
an additional error where a fuel-handling accidenit occurred and the charcoal filter was
not placed in service, either through a lapse or because it was assumed to be in service
since that was required by the current fuel- work activities, it could escalate into a much
more severe incident.
4-3-9: The Pilgrim 1 event on March 31,..1998, had minimal safety consequences. The
fuel enthalpy limits and control rod worth requirements following a rod drop accident
could not have been exceeded at any power. level [10].;
4-3-10:. For the Prairie Island 1 event on May 8, 1999,' a conservative assessment of the
consequences of dropping the reactor vessel upper internals onto the fuel within the
reactor vessel with the containment inservice purge system in operation found that
radioactive releases resulting from damage to spent fuel from a heavy load drop were
well within regulatory limits. Therefore, the event has minimal consequences for worker
and public health and safety [ 11].
4-3-11: The Salem 1 event on April 18, 2001, had no associated safety consequences,
since the dampers were closed and would remain such in case of power loss from the
battery. In the event of a fuel-handling accident at Unit 1 the dampers on the Unit 2 side
would open placing the Unit 1 control room in accident pressurized mode [12].
4-3-12: The San Onofre 3 event on January 20, 2001, had minimal safety significance,
since one train of PACU was operable and available in the case of a fuel-handling
accident. Having PACU train B inoperable would not affect the ability of the unit to
mitigate a fuel-handling accident [13]. If both trains had been rendered inoperable, .then
. 1the plant would have a significant concern over filtering of airborne radioactive
particulates and gases from the SFP area following a fuel-handling accident.
4-3-13: The Summer event on April 12, 1999, had a minimal.impact on plant safety since
the originally load cell had passed the initial surv.eillance test. Improper switch condition
only affects the readout, and not the function of capabilities of the load cell.. The crane-
and load cell adequately handled necessary loads during cote alteration activities [14]. :
4-3-14: In the Susquehanna event on July 26, 2002, could potentially have resulted in a
significant reduction in the effectiveness of the storage confinement system due. to the
backfilling of argon gas instead of helium. The DSC contains 52 fuel assemblies that had
been stored in a SFP greater than ten years. The design heat load for that DSC is 19.24-
kW, while the heat load generated by the fuel assemblies 9.152kW. The DSC water
temperature was kept below 160 degrees Fahrenheit until restoration activities were
'
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complete, to limit peak fuel-cladding temperatures. The maximum cladding temperature
that the fuel stored in the DSC was determined to be below the design basis fuel cladding
temperature limits. The argon gas had no short-term adverse chemical effects on the fuel.
Since there was no fuel damage or radiological releases resulting from filling the DSC
with argon gas, after corrective actions were taken, there were no adverse consequences
to:public health and safety, although the potentially consequences could have largely:
impacted fuel storage reliability [15].
4-3-15: The.-Watts Bar 1 event on March 11, 2005 was considered to have minimal safety
consequences. The ABGTS filters airborne radioactive particulates from the SFP area- .
.following a fuel-handling accident. An evaluation of a fuel-handling accident with -
ABGTS inoperable, assuming all fuel rods are damaged, determined the dose rates t be -
within regulatory limits [16].:
4-4. Limitations of Present Analysis
The analysis of these results is somewhat limited by a number of factors, including the:
level of depth permitted by LERs and the subjective nature of categorization. The LERs.
used as a primary source for event analysis do give thorough investigation into events,
focusing mostly on the event description, with some details on the root cause of the
event, a brief safety consequence analysis, and corrective actions that have been taken to
remedy the situation and will be taken to prevent its reoccurrence. The limitations of this
source material cause this analysis to necessarily be incomplete. Also, the categorization
of events into specific classifications is by nature subjective.. There are specific errors..
that could be classified in more than one category, and errors that could be broken down
into component errors in multiple categories. Other systems of classification could also
be utilized effectively. The focus here. is to break down the events to best understand the
huiiian reliability issues that contributed: to the event, so this classification system,
describing the errors by the general work category followed by a more specific.
classification within that category to illuminate the contributing factors to the event,
appropriately meets the goals of this report. Decisions were made with the intent that the..
event error breakdown would best describe the occurrence of errors in the context of the
event. As a result, different structures to categorize the event could encompass afn ,
entirely different.analysis than the one presented here. .
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5. Findings and Implications of Analysis
5-1. Ventilation
Five of the 15 events involved some a ventilation system in some manner. The
functionality of the ventilation systems in the waste handling and waste treatment
buildings at the proposed geologic repository for SNF and HLW will be highly important
to preclosure safety analysis. Proper design, maintenance and operation of ventilation
systems in fuel-handling areas are necessary to mitigate radiological concerns in the
event of a fuel-handling accident.;
Ventilation systems are important to repository preclosure safety analysis. Extended
forced and natural ventilation of emplacement drifts will be utilized to prevent boiling
fronts from forming in rock pillars between emplacement drifts, and also to achieve lower
temperature operating goals [19]. The extent of ventilation necessary depends on the
waste package spacing and maximum thermal loading, ranging from 50 to 125 years
forced ventilation after the start of emplacement plus up to more than 250 years of natural
ventilation after the forced ventilation period. Technical issues concerning natural air.
passages connecting the repository to the surface will need to be addressed. However,
the emplacement drift ventilation will be more important to postclosure than preclosure
safety analysis.
The repository surface facilities' ventilation systems will be of greater importance in the
preclosure safety analysis than the emplacement drifts. The waste handling building and
waste treatment building ventilation systems are necessary for maintaining environmental
conditions appropriate for waste-handling operations, as well as worker health and safety,
and for prevention of the release of radiological contaminants to the environment and
public. Both buildings would have uncontaminated and potentially contaminated
divisions with separate ventilation systems to.prevent the spread of radioactive
particulates [19]. Inoperable ventilation systems could have detrimental effects on
worker health and safety, as well as environmental health concerns, in the event of a fuel
handling accident in either of these building..
5-2. Fuel-Handling Activities
Almost all of the events occurred during fuel-handling activities, including fuel
inspections, core off-loading and reloading, fuel bundle movements, and other refueling
processes. While refueling will not be a concern for a repository, procedures developed
for waste treatment, packaging, handling, and movement will be important. SNF and
HLW will arrive at the repository in various transportation casks.- The fuel assemblies
would be unloaded.from the casks at the waste handling building and transferred to a
holding pool, essentially a short-term SFP, and later repackaged in a standardized
container, classified as a waste package, and transported for subsurface storage [19].
With many activities involving cask preparation, decontamination, cask unloading, and
transferring, involving handling of various sizes and shapes of containers, clear
procedures need to be developed to safely control and manage work activities. The waste
handling building systems to support these activities include the ventilation system, pool
water treatment and cooling systems, electrical power system, and the monitoring and
control system [19]. Appropriate knowledge of the operation of these systems and how
they can affect proper fuel-handling activities, and completeness in incorporating
possible failures of relevant systems into waste-handling procedures, can prevent
formation of latent conditions that could develop into fuel-handling events.
In addition, the waste treatment building would be handling- waste, both liquid and solid;
resulting from repository operations. Low-level liquid radioactive waste resulting from.
cask decontaminations in the unloading pool would be recycled, if possible, or otherwise
disposed off-site in dry form. Supporting systems in the waste treatment building would
include the radiological safety system, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis
systems, ventilation system, and the radiological. control.and management systems [19].
Like the waste-handling building, proper knowledge of the operation of these systems
and the work activities being performed can significantly reduce the potential for latent
conditions to develop that could result in uncontairied radioactive particulates.
5-3. Conclusion
This study details the effect human error can have on fuel-handling activities,
emphasizing how latent conditions can directly contribute to active events. In particular,
procedural inaccuracies often create conditions that directly contribute to causes of errors
related to maintenance work practices, by lack of completeness or lack of clarity. This
could be of significant concern for a pre-closure safety assessment for a repository where
many fuel-handling work activities would be performed, where procedural inadequacies
could be latent precursors that aid in the development of fuel-handling events. Of
specific interest are fuel movement activities and appropriate ventilation systems, which
could significantly impact worker and public health and safety in the case of a fuel-
handling accident. Ventilation systems are important because they manage the flow of
airborne particulates.: Proper ventilation allows for controlled containment of
radiological contaminants. Fuel-handling events occurring under conditions of
insufficient ventilation could potentially impact worker health and safety significantly.
Fuel movement activities would occur quite frequentlyat a repository, and require a
coordinated effort on the part of fuel-handling personnel.. Thorough pre-job briefings and
precise procedural documentation can ensure that tasks are. completed efficiently and
with minimal error. By preventing the development of latent human error precursors, the
effect of human errors on fuel-handling activities can be lessened.
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